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The place and status of narrative in the law and in legal studies
strike me as uncertain and ambiguous. On the one hand, trial
advocates know-have known, presumably, since antiquity-that
success in the court of law depends upon telling an effective and
persuasive story. The discipline of rhetoric originated essentially to
teach courtroom practitioners how to do just that. And academic
study sympathetic to "law and literature" has recently given
considerable attention to narrative and its uses throughout the law,
as institution and as praxis.' On the other hand, one looks in vain in
legal doctrine, and in judicial opinions, for any explicit recognition
that "narrative" is a category for adjudication: that rules of evidence,
for instance, implicate questions of how stories can and should be
told. Recently, Justice David Souter evoked a concept of "narrative
integrity" in one of his Supreme Court opinions 2-so far as I can tell,
the first recognition that the literary and cultural category of
narrative needs to be imported into legal thinking, and one that thus
far has had no sequels.
Legal scholarship first registered the importance of narrative
through an attention to "storytelling for oppositionists"--the claim
that narrative is an important tool for individuals and communities
* Sterling Professor of Comparative Literature and French, Yale University. I wish to
express thanks for helpful dialogue on the present essay to Simon Stern, Paul Gewirtz, Jennifer
Mnookin, and Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks.
1. See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000);
GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW (2000); LAW'S
STORIES (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1998).
2. Johnny Lynn Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 (1997). I have discussed this
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who need to tell the concrete particulars of their experience in a way
normally excluded by legal reasoning and rule.' More recently,
Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner make the claim that "[flaw
lives on narrative." 4 If the traditional supposition of the law was that
adjudication could proceed by "examining free-standing factual data
selected on grounds of their logical pertinency," now "increasingly
we are coming to recognize that both the questions and the answers
in such matters of 'fact' depend largely upon one's choice
(considered or unconsidered) of some overall narrative as best
describing what happened or how the world works."5 If this seems
convincing, even obvious to students of narrative, I do not believe
that Amsterdam and Bruner's "we" who think in terms of
"choice ... of overall narrative" includes most judges, or many
others who contribute to official legal doctrine. Those who expound
what the law is do not overtly recognize "narrative" as an instrument
in the process of legal adjudication.
I want to argue that reading the law from the perspective of the
literary "narratologist" offers more than a playful exercise in
interdisciplinarity-that it may in fact tell us something about the
law. I note that a thoughtful commentator on "law and literature,"
Jane B. Baron, has recently claimed that writing in the field has "not
been sufficiently interdisciplinary," largely because it "has not
questioned what the category 'law' consists of and has thus tended
inadvertently to reinforce the notion of law as autonomous."6 While
I believe that breaching the autonomy of the law-or what I would
prefer to call its hermeticism--is no easy task since the law tends to
reject transplants from other bodies of thought, Baron's challenge
must be taken up.7 An area of legal thought that seems to cry out for
a breaching of law's hermeticism--an opening up to literary thinking
and narratological analysis-is that concerned with Fourth
Amendment reasoning on "searches and seizures." Any talk of
search and seizure almost inevitably implies a narrative, and
recently-doubtless because the "war on drugs" has produced so
many instances-these narratives have become increasingly tortuous
and dubious. Moreover, the search narrative offers a particularly
striking instance of the necessary though unarticulated
3. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989). A number of other essays on this same theme may be
found in the same issue of the Michigan LawReview.
4. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 1, at 111.
5. Id
6. Jane B. Baron, Law Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE L.J.
1059, 1061 (1999).
7. On the hermeticism of the law, see Peter Brooks, Law, Culture, Therapy, 13 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 227 (2001).
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retrospectivity of legal narrative, its structuring by its ending. Where
that narrative is a hypothetical one, its teleological structure
becomes all the more evident and questionable. What follows is not
an attempt to deal with the vast and complex domain of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, but with some concrete narratological
problems arising from the ways in which certain searches are
recounted by the courts. What interests me here is not so much the
events evoked by legal decisionmakers as the way they are told.
Stories are not events in the world, but the way we speak them--a
distinction easily forgotten.
I. SEARCHING FOR PAMELA POWERS'S BODY
The case of Brewer v. Williams,8 decided by the Supreme Court in
1977, turns on a fateful ride in a police cruiser over the "snowy and
slippery miles" between Davenport and Des Moines, Iowa, on
December 26, 1968. In the police cruiser, Detective Leaming delivers
what has become known as "the Christian Burial Speech" to the man
he has in custody, Robert Williams, suspected of murdering ten-year-
old Pamela Powers. Addressing Williams, whom he knows to be a
deeply religious person, as "Reverend," Leaming evokes the weather
conditions, the forecast of several inches of snow, and the likelihood
that the young girl's body will be buried and unlocatable. Since
Williams must know where the body is, he could take the police
officers to it-and then her parents could give her a decent Christian
burial. "I want to give you something to think about while we're
traveling down the road," Leaming says:
They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel
that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little
girl's body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and if
you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it.
And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into
Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that
the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian
burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on
Christmas [E]ve and murdered.... I do not want you to answer
me. I don't want to discuss it any further. Just think about it as
we're riding down the road.'
Williams eventually directs the police to a service station, where he
claims to have left the girl's shoes, then to a rest area where he
claims to have left a blanket in which the body was wrapped, and
finally leads them to the body itself.
8. 430 U.S. 387.
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The problem is that the Davenport attorney representing Williams
has obtained a promise from the police that his client will not be
questioned during the ride-from which the attorney has been
excluded-and that promise has been confirmed in a phone call to
Williams's attorney in Des Moines. Thus the information about the
location of the body elicited by the "Christian Burial Speech" is
obtained through a violation of Williams's Sixth Amendment right to
the assistance of counsel and, by the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in
Brewer v. Williams, should not have been allowed as evidence. The
Court remanded the case for retrial, noting that at retrial evidence of
the body's location and condition "might well be admissible on the
theory that the body would have been discovered in any event, even
had incriminating statements not been obtained from Williams."'
That discovery "in any event" would then be the issue at contest
when the case of Robert Williams--convicted of first-degree murder
at his second trial, and sentenced to life imprisonment-returned to
the Supreme Court in 1984 as Nix v. Williams.1"
Back to December 26, 1968. While Detective Leaming and Robert
Williams were shut in the police cruiser making its way west on
Interstate 80, a search party of some 200 volunteers directed by
Agent Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation was
searching for the body of Pamela Powers. The search party set off at
10 a.m., moving westward through Poweshiek County into Jasper
County. Ruxlow had marked highway maps of the two counties as
grids, and assigned teams of four to six persons to search each grid.
The searchers were instructed to "check all the roads, the ditches,
any culverts.... If they came upon any abandoned farm buildings,
they were instructed to go onto the property and search those
abandoned farm buildings or any places where a small child could be
secreted. ' 12 The search party did not find the body. At about 3 p.m.,
Learning sent word to Ruxlow that Williams would lead him to the
body, and the search was called off. At this point, searchers were
some two and a half miles from where the body lay, near a culvert in
Polk County. The map of Polk County had not yet been divided into
grids for searching, but Ruxlow testified that he had that county
map, and would have marked it off for the search party had it been
necessary for the search to continue. The body was found in the
easternmost part of Polk County. Another three to five hours of
searching should have been sufficient to discover it.
On the basis of this record, the Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams,
10. Id. at 407 n.12.
11. 467 U.S. 431.
12. Transcript of Hearings on Motion to Suppress, quoted in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at
448-49 (alteration in original).
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in an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, accepted the
notion that the so-called "exclusionary rule" barring evidence
illegally seized allows for an exception for "inevitable discovery."
This was the conclusion of the trial court when Williams was retried
and convicted. As summarized and underlined by Burger:
The trial court concluded that the State had proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that, if the search had not been
suspended and Williams had not led the police to the victim, her
body would have been discovered "within a short time" in
essentially the same condition as it was actually found. The trial
court also ruled that if the police had not located the body, "the
search would clearly have been taken up again where it left off,
given the extreme circumstances of this case and the body would
[have] been found in short order." In finding that the body
would have been discovered in essentially the same condition as
it was actually found, the court noted that freezing temperatures
had prevailed and tissue deterioration would have been
suspended.13
In other words, the inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule-accepted in a large majority of courts, both state
and federal, but not explicitly by the Supreme Court before the
present case-appears to depend on a factual narrative, one that can
precisely prove, or at least forcefully suggest, true inevitability. The
search party had proceeded methodically across those grids in
Poweshiek and Jasper counties; it was about to enter Polk, which was
about to be grid-lined as well; it was only two and a half miles from
the site. "The child's body was found next to a culvert in a ditch
beside a gravel road in Polk County, about two miles south of
Interstate 80, and essentially within the area to be searched."14 Like
"the place where the three roads meet" in Sophocles's Oedipus
Tyrannos--where Oedipus meets and slays his unknown father-the
place of Pamela Powers's body is designated as a place of fatal and
inevitable convergence. The body was there, preserved by the
freezing weather, waiting to be discovered. 5
But counsel for Williams makes an ingenious attempt to rebut the
doctrine of inevitable discovery, arguing that it is "only the 'post hoc
rationalization' that the search efforts would have proceeded two
and one-half miles into Polk County where Williams had led the
13. 467 U.S. at 437-38 (citation omitted).
14. Id at 436.
15. It should be noted, however, that the habeas petition-though not the trial records-in
Williams's case suggests that the body might not have been so inevitably subject to discovery:
It was covered with snow, and in a culvert not visible from the road. See Phillip E. Johnson,
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police to the body."'6 The point may be well taken. The doctrine of
inevitable discovery clearly starts from the end of the trail of the
search-at the dead body-and then traces the path, be it inevitable
or merely probable, that would have led to it. "Inevitable discovery"
implicitly suggests that narratives work back from their ends, which
are the real determinants of their vectors, the direction and intention
of their plotting. A number of theorists of narrative have argued that
such is the logic of narrative: that a large part of the coherence of
narrative derives from the knowledge that an end lies in wait, to
complete and elucidate whatever is put in motion at the start. 7
Narratives tend to make their endings appear inevitable since that is
part and parcel of their meaning-making function. If, as Aristotle
claims in his Poetics, stories have a beginning, a middle, and an end,
it would be the poor (or particularly challenging) story in which
there appeared to be no relation between beginning and end. And in
this sense, Williams's lawyer's effort to contest "inevitable
discovery" may be on target: inevitable discovery perhaps has less to
do with the way things happen in the world than with our narrative
expectations. The body was there, waiting for the search party to
discover it-just as, in a famous Chekhov example, the gun hung on
the wall in Act I of the play is waiting to be discharged at someone's
head in Act III." To call discovery inevitable is to view the story
from the perspective of the end and to subscribe to a possibly
mechanistic notion that plots grind on to their logical outcome, in a
version of Jean Cocteau's "infernal machine."' 9
Justice William Brennan-joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall-
dissents in Nix v. Williams precisely on a version of this point.
Brennan accuses the Court, "[i]n its zealous efforts to emasculate the
exclusionary rule," of losing sight of "the crucial difference between
the 'inevitable discovery' doctrine and the 'independent source'
exception from which it is derived."'2 The "independent source"
exception allows the use of evidence found by an independent and
16. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 448.
17. See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, S/Z (1970); PETER BROOKS, READING FOR THE PLOT
(1984); FRANK KERMODE, THE SENSE OF AN ENDING (1967); JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, LA
NAUSEE (1938).
18. ANTON CHEKHOV, LITERARY AND THEATRICAL REMINISCENCES 23 (S.S.
Koteliansky trans., 1974). I find another version of Chekhov's remarks in an important essay
by the Russian Formalist Boris Tomachevsky, in a discussion of narrative "motivation," that is,
the narrative economy by which all properties and episodes must be made functional:
"Chekhov referred to just such compositional motivation when he stated that if one speaks
about a nail being beaten into a wall at the beginning of a narrative, then at the end the hero
must hang himself on that nail." Boris Tomachevsky, Thematics, in RUSSIAN FORMALIST
CRITICISM 79 (Lee T. Lemon & Marion J. Reis eds. & trans., 1965). On a similar concept of
"motivation," see my quotation from Gerard Genette, infra p. 84.
19. See JEAN COCTEAU, LA MACHINE INFERNALE (1933).
20. Nix, 467 U.S. at 459.
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lawful investigation even when there has been a constitutional
violation elsewhere in the search. "Inevitable discovery" similarly
requires an independent and lawful investigation, but
it differs in one key respect from its next of kin: specifically, the
evidence sought to be introduced at trial has not actually been
obtained from an independent source, but rather would have
been discovered as a matter of course if independent
investigations were allowed to proceed.
... The inevitable discovery exception necessarily implicates a
hypothetical finding that differs in kind from the factual finding
that precedes application of the independent source rule."
Brennan finds that inevitable discovery contains a measure of the
hypothetical-what Williams's lawyer calls a "post-hoc
rationalization"--and therefore concludes that it requires a higher
standard of proof than the "preponderance of the evidence" test
accepted by the majority. Instead, says Brennan, the Court should
insist upon "clear and convincing" evidence when the inevitable
discovery exception is invoked. That is, since inevitable discovery,
unlike independent source evidence, depends on a hypothetical
narrative, it requires a heightened burden of proof, upon which the
lower courts failed to insist.
The distinction between evidence in fact discovered by an
independent investigation and that which "inevitably" would have
been discovered seems more crucial than the majority in Nix v.
Williams allows. The hypothetical "would have been discovered,"
operating post hoc, may be determined more by the narrative logic
of retrospectivity than the Court sees or admits. In the case of
Pamela Powers's body there was an actual search party on course to
reach the object of the search with high probability, if not true
inevitability. In some subsequent cases, the inevitable discovery
doctrine has been given far more dubious uses. For instance, cocaine
found in a person's baggage in a search not incident to his arrest, a
search only held later without apparent probable cause, was allowed
as evidence on the grounds that the cocaine would inevitably have
been discovered since there would have routinely been an
"inventory search" of the suspect's possessions.22 This doubles the
"would haves." Even more dubiously, courts have held that evidence
found in an illegal warrantless search was admissible because a
search warrant could have and would have been obtained if the
21. Id.
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police had sought it.23 On this logic, the exclusionary rule could
become a dead letter whenever one could plausibly argue that
evidence would have been legally discovered if the police had
discovered it by legal means.
Standing at the vantage point of the end of the story, the proof that
the suspect was in fact guilty of illegal activity, the post-hoc logic of
the inevitable discovery doctrine can be used to justify practically
anything. It simply espouses the very logic of narrative, which makes
sense by way of its end. Note that an application for a search warrant
itself involves telling the story of what you expect to find in the
search-an expectation that then will be confirmed or falsified by the
search itself. When you elide the difference between the standpoint
from which you state what you expect will be the outcome, and the
standpoint of the outcome from which you state that this was what
you expected all along, you begin to efface the difference between
the probable-the hypothetical fiction-and the actual. You confuse
the logic of the telling of the story with the putative logic of the
events the story tells.
I shall return to the logic of narrative in a moment. First, I need to
explore a bit more the hypothetical search versus the real search. In
an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case in 1988, Feldhacker v.
United States,24 Julia Lynn Feldhacker and Mark David Critz
claimed that the government obtained the names of five witnesses
(purchasers of drugs from Feldhacker) through statements of the
defendants subsequently ruled to have been illegally obtained. The
prosecution responded that the identities of the purchasers-witnesses
would inevitably have been discovered because it legally discovered
two address books containing the names of the purchasers. To which
the defense responded that the prior "tainted knowledge" permitted
the prosecution to pick out the relevant names from the lists of
addresses, which were fragmentary and vague. The Court of Appeals
ruled in the government's favor, but conceded in a footnote:
There are reasonable limits to the scope that courts will impute
to the hypothetical untainted investigation. An investigation
conducted over an infinite time with infinite thoroughness will,
of course, "ultimately or inevitably" turn up any and all pieces
of evidence in the world. Prosecutors may not justify unlawful
extractions of information post hoc where lawful methods
present only a theoretical possibility of discovery. While
hypothetical discovery by lawful means need not be reached as
rapidly as that actually reached by unlawful means, the lawful
23. See United States v. Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); State v. Butler, 676
S.W.2d 809 (Mo. 1984).
24. 849 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1988).
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discovery must be inevitable through means that would actually
have been employed. Cf Williams .... 25
This comment opens the dizzying perspective of a kind of narrative
utopia, where an infinitely extended search of infinite thoroughness
would inevitably discover everything in the world. It registers a
breathtaking confidence in the legibility of the world, and the
capacity of human intelligence to decipher it. Or is the court being
ironic, simply offering a reductio ad absurdam of search doctrine?
Whatever the intended tone here, the comment stands with the
premises of the classic detective story-in the tales of Sherlock
Holmes, for instance-or Wilkie Collins's The Moonstone, where
Sergeant Cuff believes that if you search the detritus of civilization
long enough, the needed clues will come to light.26 But it also figures
a kind of eventual impasse of narrative as discovery in the infinitely
protracted search for all the evidence in the world-something that
might figure in a story by Jorge Luis Borges. In fact, Borges's Funes
the Memorious instances the narrative problem created when
someone has infinite powers of memory, resulting in the recreation
of a past in every detail, which means that going over that past will
take as much time as the past itself.7 The doctrine of "infinite
discovery," as one might call it, may return us in disquieting ways to
the hypothetical narratives of "inevitable discovery," which
depend-as narrative always does--on a selection of what is
considered to be relevant, and thus on the creation of a sense of the
inevitable.
II. POISONED FRUIT AND NARRATIVE LINKS
Before exploring further the "narratological" implications of
inevitable (and possibly infinite) discovery, I need to say something
more about the context of these Fourth Amendment "exclusionary
rule" cases. The argument in these cases often turns on whether the
evidence in question is "tainted" because it is "fruit of the poisonous
tree"--that is, derived from an illegally-obtained and therefore
tainted source-or rather whether the evidence has been found by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be "purged" of that taint. The
rule that evidence illegally obtained cannot be used for prosecution
25. Feldhacker, 849 F.2d at 296 n.4 (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 448-50).
26. See, for example, the Superintendent's contemptuous remark, "There is such a thing,
Sergeant, as making a mountain out of a molehill. Good day," to which Cuff replies, "There is
such a thing as making nothing out of a molehill, in consequence of your head being too high
to see it." WILKIE COLLINS, THE MOONSTONE 104 (Oxford World's Classics 1999) (1868).
27. JORGE LuiS BORGES, Funes the Memorious, in LABYRINTHS 59 (James E. Irby trans.,
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derives from the 1920 case, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States,28 where Justice Holmes wrote: "The essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not
merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but
that it shall not be used at all. ' 29 The language of tree and fruit seems
then to be introduced in 1939, in Nardone v. United States," a
wiretap case where Justice Frankfurter, considering whether the
evidence was obtained from an "independent source" or not, wrote:
Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between
information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the
Government's proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such
connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint.... The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first
instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that wire-
tapping was unlawfully employed. Once that is established-as
was plainly done here-the trial judge must give opportunity,
however closely confined, to the accused to prove that a
substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the
poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the
Government to convince the trial court that its proof had an
independent origin.3
In considering how the "taint" of illegally obtained evidence might
be "dissipated," Frankfurter arrives at the metaphor of the "fruit of
the poisonous tree." It then assumed its classic, oft-cited form in
1963, in Wong Sun v. United States." By 1985, in Oregon v.
Elstac 3-- a case concerning whether or not the defendant's
confession was illegally obtained-Justice O'Connor can write: "The
arguments in favor of suppression of respondent's written confession
rely heavily on metaphor. One metaphor, familiar from the Fourth
Amendment context, would require that respondent's confession,
regardless of its integrity, voluntariness, and probative value, be
suppressed as the 'tainted fruit of the poisonous tree .....
Here is the metaphor in full. Somewhere in the background one
seems to hear a Miltonic echo:
28. 251 U.S. 385.
29. Id. at 392.
30. 308 U.S. 338.
31. Id. at 341.
32. 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (referring to "fruit of the poisonous tree").
33. 470 U.S. 298.
34. Id. at 341.
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Of Man's first disobedience, and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree whose mortal taste
Brought death into the World, and all our woe . ..35
Now, in Paradise Lost, the Tree of Knowledge, of good and evil, is
not itself poisonous, but rather forbidden, which makes its fruit
poisonous to Adam and Eve. In the Fourth Amendment analogy, the
use of search methods that are constitutionally forbidden makes the
fruits of that search tainted. But note that the Court's metaphor
assigns poisonousness to the tree itself, tainting its fruits. The
question is thus one of judging whether or not the "taint" has been
"dissipated." In Elstad, Justice Brennan in dissent claims that
O'Connor's opinion is "completely at odds with established
dissipation analysis"36 and that it "marks an evisceration of the
established fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine."37 Brennan's image is
curiously vivid if somewhat baroque, suggesting eviscerated fruit
hanging on the limbs of that poisoned tree.
I cite these metaphors because they highlight the Court's need to
find language to speak of the ways in which illegally-obtained
evidence and its use or exclusion can be thought through. The
Court's problem is one of narrative discourse. If you've got a
poisonous tree, by what process can the taint attaching to its fruit be
dissipated--or does the poison linger on? The Court's resort to
metaphor-and Elstad, for instance, is shot through with
metaphor-implies that it cannot work through the problem by logic
alone, no doubt because it is not a problem in logic, but one in
narrative, one having to do with connections, how you view them,
how you may attenuate or break them. Elstad also uses images of
releasing springs, identifying a "break in the stream of events,"
letting "the cat out of the bag." Overall, one finds the Court
searching-vainly in this case-for language to represent the
relevant terms of connection. The problem is succinctly stated in
Brown v. Illinois, in 1975, when Justice Blackmun writes:
Thus, even if the statements in this case were to be found
voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment
issue remains. In order for the causal chain, between the illegal
arrest and the statements made subsequent thereto, to be
broken, Wong Sun requires not merely that the statement meet
35. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST bk. I, 11.1-3 (Northrop Frye ed., Holt, Rinehart &
Winston 1963) (1667).
36. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 338.
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the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be
"sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint."3
The metaphor of the causal chain-which must be broken to allow
the taint to be purged---images a narrative connection broken,
allowing a different story--one without taint-to be told. That
"chain," made of interconnected links, is a sure sign that we are
dealing in a specifically narrative logic.
"'You reasoned it out beautifully,' I exclaimed in unfeigned
admiration. 'It is so long a chain, and yet every link rings true.' 39
Thus Dr. Watson to Sherlock Holmes, at the end of The Red-
Headed League. Similar statements can be found at the conclusion
of many of the Holmes stories: they image a process of narrative
reasoning that brings the detective to his discovery. In a variant:
"'Wonderful!' cried the colonel. 'Wonderful! You might have been
there!""'4 Discovery is so acute that it mimics eyewitness. This last
line comes at the end of Silver Blaze, a case in which Holmes is faced
with the disappearance of the famous racehorse only a week before
the running of the Wessex Cup in which he is the favorite, and the
apparent murder of his trainer, John Straker, found bludgeoned to
death in a hollow on Dartmoor.
Holmes's discoveries in Silver Blaze occur because he is looking
for them, he expects to find them. For instance, at the scene of the
crime:
"Hullo!" said he suddenly. "What's this?" It was a wax vesta,
half burned, which was so coated with mud that it looked at first
like a little chip of wood.
"I cannot think how I came to overlook it," said the inspector
with an expression of annoyance.
"It was invisible, buried in the mud. I only saw it because I was
looking for it."
"What! you expected to find it?"
"I thought it not unlikely."41
That which is hidden reveals itself when you know it must be there,
38. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975).
39. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Red-Headed League, in THE ADVENTURE OF THE
SPECKLED BAND AND OTHER STORIES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 83 (1965) [hereinafter
STORIES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES].
40. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in STORIES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES, supra note
39, at 168.
41. Id. at 158.
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when you have postulated its discovery as inevitable. The "wax
vesta" match had to be there since Straker would have had to strike
a light in order to perform the delicate operation-nicking Silver
Blaze's tendon-that Holmes now knows Straker must have
planned. Similarly, since "[t]he horse is a very gregarious creature,"
Silver Blaze cannot be running wild on the moor; he must have gone
to a stable-if not his own, King's Pyland, then the nearby rival,
Mapleton:
He is not at King's Pyland. Therefore he is at Mapleton. Let us
take that as a working hypothesis and see what it leads to. This
part of the moor, as the inspector remarked, is very hard and
dry. But it falls away towards Mapleton, and you can see from
here that there is a long hollow over yonder, which must have
been very wet on Monday night. If our supposition is correct,
then the horse must have crossed that, and there is the point
where we should look for his tracks.42
So it is that the finding of the very tracks to be followed is
determined by what Holmes calls his "working hypothesis," a
prediction of what is to be discovered. They find the tracks, then lose
them for half a mile, then pick them up again close to Mapleton
stables, and now a man's footprints appear next to the horse's.
Tracks of horse and man now make a sharp turn back toward King's
Pyland, but Watson quickly perceives that the same prints reappear
parallel to the first track, now returning toward Mapleton. As
Holmes reconstructs the scene, Mapleton's trainer, Silas Brown (who
has heavy stakes on Silver Blaze's rival) encountered the horse
wandering on the moor early in the morning, recognized him, and in
a first impulse thought to return him to King's Pyland. He then
changed his mind, led him to Mapleton, and there painted over his
silver blaze to disguise him.
Now, Holmes need only confront Silas Brown:
"He has the horse, then?"
"He tried to bluster out of it, but I described to him so exactly
what his actions had been upon that morning that he is
convinced that I was watching him."43
The clues, the tracks, are so exactly followed that Holmes "might
have been there."' Even when found, Silver Blaze, his blaze
42. Id. at 159.
43. Id. at 161.
44. Kim Lane Scheppele has argued that American evidence law embodies a "ground
zero" theory of evidence-very much like Holmes's "you might have been there." Kim Lane
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concealed, is not detected by his owner, Colonel Ross. It is only after
the horse has won the Wessex Cup that Holmes dramatically
discloses his discovery to the others: the identity of the horse, and
the horse's identity as the murderer-in self-defense--of John
Straker.
The most memorable exchange in Silver Blaze concerns the dog in
the night. Inspector Gregory asks Holmes:
"Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my
attention?"
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
"That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes.
45
That the dog did nothing during the night while Silver Blaze was
being abducted from the stable, indicates to Holmes that the
abductor must have been a familiar of the dog, who would otherwise
have barked. So what sounds like a Monty Python routine is one
more indication of how the chain of discovery gives significance to
each incident that constitutes one of its links, even that incident
which is a non-occurrence.
The chain of discovery offers one example of what Gdrard Genette
calls "the determination of means by ends ... of causes by effects."
Genette states further:
This is that paradoxical logic of fiction which requires us to
define every element, every unit of the narrative by its
functional character, that is to say among other things by its
correlation with another unit, and to account for the first (in the
order of narrative temporality) by the second, and so on ....
The linking of events means that their enchainment is determined by
the post-hoc reasoning of the discoverer, then laid out as a plot
leading from beginning to discovery. The discourse of narrative
"motivation"--as in Chekhov's example of the gun hung on the
wall--plots the story from end to beginning, then recounts it from
beginning to end. The continuing popularity of detective fiction may
in part derive from its dramatizing so evidently -perhaps too
facilely-the very process of narrative plotting.
"Discovery" in Silver Blaze is not inevitable-indeed, all the
would-be discoverers are stumped until Holmes comes on the scene.
45. Id. at 163-64.
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But it is part of Holmes's prestige and continuing appeal to make
discovery appear inevitable. The Holmes stories postulate a
knowable world, a universe governed by laws that are ultimately
discoverable to the percipient and patient investigator-like that
world imaged in the strange footnote to Feldhacker. Crime is an
aberrancy in the world, the introduction of the menace of chaos. But
discovery through reason shows that the chaos is only apparent.
Holmes's discovery sounds as a victory of law over chance, reason
over aberrancy, and restores a world of perfect order.
III. SEARCH AND THE HUNTSMAN'S PARADIGM
In an ambitious argument that touches on Sherlock Holmes, on
Freud, and on the prototype of a kind of discovery procedure used
by both that was elaborated by the art historian Giovanni
Morelli-whose premise was that in order to authenticate a painting,
one should look to minute details such as earlobes and fingernails,
where an artist's unique characteristics would be better revealed
than in the ensemble--Carlo Ginzburg undertakes to isolate and
define a special form of cognition by way of clues." Knowing by way
of clues, following the traces left by one's quarry, is of course the
detective's method. It doesn't work by deduction from a general law
(though it may call upon fragments of general wisdom, e.g. "the
horse is a gregarious animal"), nor does it quite work inductively
from part to whole. It is rather a science of the concrete and
particular that achieves its discoveries through putting particulars
together in a narrative chain. Ginzburg identifies this science with
the huntsman's lore:
Man has been a hunter for thousands of years. In the course of
countless pursuits he learned to reconstruct the shapes and
movements of his invisible prey from tracks in the mud, broken
branches, droppings of excrement, tufts of hair, entangled
feathers, stagnating odors. He learned to sniff out, record,
interpret, and classify such infinitesimal traces as trails of spittle.
He learned how to execute complex mental operations with
lightning speed, in the depth of a forest or in a prairie with its
hidden dangers.4"
Even in a post-hunting society, searches reach their discoveries by
such tracking of details, making them into a chain of meaning,
47. CARLO GINZBURG, Spie. Radici di un paradigma indizario, in Mm EMBLEMI SPIE
158-209 (1986) [hereinafter GINZBURG, SPIE]. For an English translation, see CARLO
GINZBURG, Clues: Roots of an Evidential Paradigm, in MYTHS, EMBLEMS, CLUES 96-125
(John Tedeschi & Anne C. Tedeschi trans., 1990) [hereinafter GINZBURG, CLUES]. I have
modified the Tedeschi translation in places in order to give a more literal rendition.
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uncovering their connections. Ginzburg speculates that this kind of
knowing may in fact lie at the inception of narrative itself:
This knowledge is characterized by the ability to move from
apparently insignificant experiential data to a complex reality
that cannot be experienced directly. And the data is always
arranged by the observer in such a way as to produce a narrative
sequence, which could be expressed most simply as "someone
passed this way." Perhaps the very idea of narrative (as distinct
from the incantation, exorcism, or invocation) was born in a
hunting society, from the experience of deciphering tracks. 9
On Ginzburg's hypothesis, narrative would be a cognitive
instrument of a specific type, one "invented" for the decipherment of
details of the real that only take on their meaning when linked in a
series, enchained in a manner that allows one to detect that
"someone passed this way." This is what Sherlock Holmes's
searches-for a wax vesta, for hoofprints in the muddy hollows of
the moor-are all about. And the "huntsman's paradigm" may
indicate in more general terms the use-value of narrative as a form of
speech and cognition: it is the instrument we use when the
combination of particulars into a meaningful sequence seems to be
the only way to track down our quarry, whatever it may be. Working
from Ginzburg's suggestions, Terence Cave argues that the
huntsman's or "cynegetic paradigm" points us toward that most basic
and enduring and useful of plots: the story that leads to anagnorisis
or recognition:
The sign of recognition in drama and narrative fiction belongs,
then, to the same mode of knowledge as the signature, the clue,
the fingerprint or footprint and all the other tracks and traces
that enable an individual to be identified, a criminal to be
caught, a hidden event or state of affairs to be reconstructed."
Signs of recognition in literature reach back to antiquity and
forward to modernity: see the scar on Odysseus's thigh that enables
his old nurse Eurykleia to recognize him by touch, or the hidden
birthmark of Shakespeare's Cymbeline, or the notorious croix de ma
more of nineteenth-century melodrama, the token which at the
denouement allows the orphan to be recognized, true identities
established. It is easy to recognize that the law, particularly when
dealing with issues of evidence, must make use of the huntsman's
paradigm, seeking to show how finding signs and deciphering tracks
will lead to the apprehension of what passed that way.
Ginzburg further specifies the relation of the huntsman's paradigm
49. GINZBURG, SPIE, supra note 47, at 166; GINZBURG, CLUES, supra note 47, at 103.
50. TERENCE CAVE, RECOGNITIONS: A STUDY IN POETICS 250 (1988).
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to law in his discussion of the arcane subject of divination, as in the
Mesopotamian tradition, based on the minute investigation of
seemingly trivial details: "animals' innards, drops of oil on the water,
stars, involuntary movements of the body."5 According to Ginzburg,
Mesopotamian jurisprudence was similarly oriented toward the
interpretation of particulars: "Mesopotamian legal texts themselves
did not consist of collections of laws or statutes but of discussions of
concrete examples."52 So that the same paradigm can be found in the
divinatory and jurisprudential texts, with this difference: the former
are directed to the future, the latter to the past. Ginzburg then
further stretches his hypothesis to suggest that narrative modes of
knowing (such as archaeology, paleontology, geology) all make what
he calls "retrospective prophecies,"53 which he sees as the key to the
popularity of detective fiction.
The "case method" of American legal study-introduced by C.C.
Langdell at Harvard Law School shortly before Conan Doyle began
his Sherlock Holmes tales-resembles the Mesopotamian approach
in its insistence that argument be worked up from concrete
particulars.' Here the concept of "retrospective prophecy" is also
relevant: that which is plotted forward to the predictable outcome
can be so ordered because one in fact stands at the point of the
outcome. The point of the exercise, in a pedagogical and cognitive
sense, is to retrace how that outcome was inevitable from the "facts
of the case." And if we enjoy the mental processes activated by
detective fiction and legal argument, it must be in part because of the
satisfaction derived from the demonstration of inevitability: it had to
be this way, and no other way.
Searches for evidence may always include a "retrospective
prophecy" factor. In an example noted earlier, an application for a
search warrant must contain a prediction of what is to be found. The
warrant application sets forth the evidence that the police believe
they (inevitably) will find if given permission to search. Warrants
must be based on "probable cause" that what is sought will be found.
In this sense, searches for evidence always involve a prior story, a
hypothetical story which the search intends to confirm.
The doctrine of "inevitable discovery," however, offers a
particularly clear instance of "retrospective prophecy." It makes the
claim that a trail to the quarry exists, and that the (hypothetical)
following of the traces and tracks making up this trail would
(certainly) lead to the quarry. In other words, it takes the logic of the
51. GINZBURG, SPIE, supra note 47, at 168-69; GINZBURG, CLUES, supra note 47, at 104.
52. GINZBURG, SPIE, supra note 47, at 168-69; GINZBURG, CLUES, supra note 47, at 104.
53. GINZBURG, SPIE, supra note 47, at 183; GINZBURG, CLUES, supra note 47, at 117.
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huntsman's paradigm--the logic of narrative knowing-and, in its
hypothetical application of the paradigm (to a case in which the
quarry was not but would have been found) exposes the logic of
discovery, as a narrative process. In the doctrine of inevitable
discovery, we know that the quarry is there, at the end of the trail.
The question is whether following the trail would inevitably have led
to it. When you decide-as in Nix-that it would have, you subscribe
to the logic of narrative discovery in a particularly telling way,
accepting that the huntsman's lore is infallible, and infallibly
cognitive. When as a legal decisionmaker you so decide, you may be
simply affirming the nature of the law as discipline: affirming its
belief in evidence as the meaningful entailment of tracks and traces.
If pushed to its limits, the inevitable discovery doctrine can indeed
result in some (limited) version of the "all pieces of evidence in the
world" becoming admissible in some putative search of "infinite
thoroughness." For instance, as I noted earlier, in cases where police
claim that a passenger's luggage or the trunk of a car would
inevitably have been subject to an "inventory search," the fruits of
an illegal search have sometimes been admitted on grounds that they
would have inevitably been discovered by the later routine search.5
Yet more dubiously, the doctrine has been used to admit evidence
found in an illegal, warrantless search on the grounds that a warrant
could have and would have been obtained, and thus the evidence
would have been inevitably discovered. 6 Both these instances
further lay bare the device, and further suggest how assumptions
about the narrative outcome shape the story, and confer, precisely,
the sense of inevitability on the unfolding of its plot.
The huntsman's paradigm may be said to intersect in modern
societies with an identity paradigm. The classic detective story came
into being and flourished in an era during which emergent bourgeois
society became increasingly anxious about signs of identity of its
criminal elements. Cities were growing rapidly, especially from an
influx of the poor from the provinces looking for work. The laboring
classes, as Louis Chevalier so well demonstrated, came to appear
dangerous classes.57 The increasingly undifferentiated mass of city
dwellers called for positive identification of its malefactors and
marginals. Prostitutes in Paris, for instance, were required to register
55. See United States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986). But see United States v.
Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty-Eight Dollars in United States
Currency, 944 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
56. See United States v. Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); State v. Butler, 676
S.W.2d 809 (Mo. 1984).
57. See Louis CHEVALIER, CLASSES LABORIEUSES ET CLASSES DANGEREUSES (1958).
For an English translation, see LOUIS CHEVALIER, LABOURING CLASSES AND DANGEROUS
CLASSES (Frank Jellinek trans., 1973).
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with the police, to carry a card if streetwalkers, to be assigned a
number if in a brothel. When ]a marque--the practice of branding
convicts' bodies with letters signifying their sentence-was abolished
on humanitarian grounds in France in 1832, a new anxiety developed
concerning the identification of recidivists.
Balzac, who so often captures the spirit of his time, dramatized the
use of la marque in the person of his arch-criminal, Jacques Collin,
alias Vautrin, alias the Reverend Father Carlos Herrera, alias
Trompe-la-Mort, or Cheat-Death. Balzac was writing about a period
in which la marque still existed, but from the retrospect of its
abolition. In Splendeurs et mis~res des courtisanes, he stages a scene
where Collin, in his disguise as the Spanish priest Herrera, is brought
before the examining magistrate Camusot and stripped to the waist."
The bailiff then strikes him on the shoulder with an ebony bat, to see
if the letters of ]a marque--TF, for travaux forc6s, forced labor- will
reappear. Readers of the earlier novel Le Pre Goriot know that
Collin is so marked-we've seen the mark. But now it appears to
have disappeared, its place taken by scars, some seventeen holes in
the flesh. The bailiff remarks that the cross bar of the T might lie
between two holes, and that another might mark the foot of the
letter. But the scars are "capriciously" distributed on the shoulder,
the result of shotgun wounds, according to Collin (he has in fact
inflicted the wounds himself, to efface the fatal letters). There are
hence suggestions of letters, but nothing that can be read
definitively: "It's nonetheless quite vague," Camusot concludes. 9
The identity of the criminal once branded in his very flesh has
become an indecipherable text.
The need to identify recidivists in particular, and to categorize and
classify the criminal population in general, led to various other
systems, all considered "scientific" in their time. Photography,
almost from the moment of its invention, was turned to recording the
features of those apprehended by the police. Then
"bertillonage"-the cranial and bodily measurements invented by
Alphonse Bertillon-became the standard. An elaborate set of
measurements and identifying marks were entered on index cards,
which then were filed so as to be retrievable by way of cranial type
and size, not by name-since impostors and aliases were, after all,
part of the problem. At the same time, Cesare Lombroso and his
followers were working out the classification of criminal "types" of
physiology, convinced that criminality had organic origins and took
58. HONORt DE BALZAC, SPLENDEURS ET MISfRES DES COURTISANES, in 6 LA COMIDIE
HUMAINE 751 (Biblioth~que de la Pliade 1977) (1838-47). For an English translation, see A
HARLOT HIGH AND LOw (1970).
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somatic forms. If identification and triage of a European criminal
population was difficult, the problem posed by the subject peoples of
the colonies was far worse. To European eyes, they all looked the
same. They had no "identifying marks."'
Eventually, an official of the British Raj "discovered"
fingerprinting. It seems probable that Bengalis had long used tip
sahi, a kind of fingerprint signature, and their English rulers then
merely adapted it to their own uses. The technique quickly migrated
back to Europe. When systems were worked out for categorizing and
retrieving prints according to type, fingerprinting became the queen
of identifying marks. Western cultures came to believe in two
infallible characteristics of fingerprints: their uniqueness (no two
people have the same) and their permanency (time and aging do not
change them). In turn, we came to accept the claims of experts that
they could identify a "match" between prints. But the line that
separates science from pseudo-science shifts over time. Now DNA
promises a surer identification, wrested from minute samples of
blood or hair. And at the same time, the reliance on fingerprinting
has been questioned.
A U.S. District Court decision by Judge Louis H. Pollak in January
2002 expressed doubt that fingerprint identification met the standard
of "scientific evidence" set by Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals in 1993.61 Pollak noted that other recent federal
cases have called fingerprint identification "the very archetype of
reliable expert testimony"62 and "scientific knowledge,"'63 but that it
failed on the grounds of testability and especially falsifiability.6
Pollak cited Justice Harry Blackmun in Daubert (himself citing an
evidence treatise): "Scientific methodology today is based on
60. On these points of history, see the very rich study by SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT
IDENTITIES (2001). On the individual and his traces, see ALAIN CORBIN, DE LA RtVOLUTION
A LA GRANDE GUERRE 419-36 (Michelle Perrot ed., 1987); 4 HISTOIRE DE LA VIE PRIVtE,
(Philippe Ari~s & Georges Duby eds., 1987). For an English translation, see ALAIN CORBIN,
FROM THE FIRES OF THE REVOLUTION TO THE GREAT WAR (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
1990).
61. The first Pollak opinion comes in United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492
(E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated by 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). See also Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
62. 179 F. Supp. 2d at 501 (quoting United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855
(S.D. Ind. 2000), aff'd260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
63. Id. (quoting United States v. Joseph, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6399, 2001 WL 515213, *4
(E.D. La. May 14, 2001).
64. In a lucid exposition of the problem of fingerprint evidence-written before Llera
Plaza--Jennifer Mnookin points out that the error rate in fingerprint identification is
essentially unknown, and has never really been tested. When fingerprint evidence entered U.S.
courtrooms early in the twentieth century, it was rapidly accepted--no doubt because it
belonged to the identificatory paradigm we have been discussing--and never truly subjected to
scientific testing. See Jennifer Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 13, 19 (2001).
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generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be
falsified."65 It is the test of falsifiability that allows one to know not
only that a proposition is true a good deal of the time, in many cases,
but that it is universally true. Fingerprint identification, while
mustering a considerable body of expertise, does not in the final
analysis meet this test. It is indeed the final step in fingerprint
identification-the determination of a match between two sets of
fingerprints--that involves a subjective judgment rather than a
scientific procedure. Pollak cited forensic scientist Dr. David Stoney:
"The determination that a fingerprint examiner makes.., when
comparing a latent fingerprint with a known fingerprint, specifically
the determination that there is sufficient basis for an absolute
identification is not a scientific determination. It is a subjective
determination standard. It is a subjective determination without
objective standards to it. 66
Therefore Pollak ruled that experts may present analysis of
fingerprints and point out observed similarities between prints, but
"will not be permitted to present testimony expressing an opinion of
an expert witness that a particular latent print matches, or does not
match, the rolled print of a particular person and hence is, or is not,
the fingerprint of that person. 
67
In this decision, Pollak appeared to return fingerprint
identification from the realm of "science" to the domain where it
may more properly belong: that of description and analysis and
inference. It is part of that search for identity through signifying
marks discussed by Ginzburg, and part of modern societies' concern
with the identity paradigm. Pollak noted, citing another forensic
expert, that "[t]raditionally, fingerprint training has centered around
a type of apprenticeship, tutelage, or on-the-job training. '68 This, too,
suggests that the processes of fingerprint identification constitute
essentially a refinement of the "huntsman's paradigm." The kind of
"knowing" achieved in this paradigm, in the Holmesian work of
identification, and in narrative cognition in general, is not scientific;
it does not work from testable hypotheses, it is not falsifiable. It
rather enchains a series of concrete particulars in a "case," and
shows how they are linked to one another toward identification of an
65. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 505 (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and
Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and
Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643 (1992), quoted in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. Id. at 507.
67. Id. at 518.




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2003
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
animal, or person, who has been there and left traces. We are, as in
the detective story or the melodrama, in a paradigm of recognition.
But Pollak reversed himself in March 2002, arguing that the test of
science was the wrong one to employ, that technical knowledge is
rather the issue, and on these grounds fingerprint identification
passes muster.69 This readmits fingerprint testimony without truly
resolving the question of its objectivity and ultimate reliability. One
of the merits of Pollak's original decision-had it stood-might have
been to reclassify the kind of knowing activated by fingerprint
identification, to reconceive it as part of the hunt for identity that has
long been a concern of human intuition and narrative cognition.
Western culture in the wake of Romanticism liked to believe that
each person's body had a unique "signature." But Bertillon's
descriptions of human faces and expressions now read to us like the
descriptions of a nineteenth-century novelist become excessively
formulaic and repetitive. Is it predictable that fingerprints may one
day seem to fall in the same domain as la croix de ma mar e the
token that permits recognition because it belongs to a narrative
convention of cognition, to the signs on which this form of cognition
has decided to confer significance? At the present vantage
point-with much still to be learned about the craft of fingerprint
analysis and its claim to pass muster as scientific evidence-one
cannot say with any certainty. But one can say that the law needs to
consider more carefully the status and probative value of a kind of
evidence that probably does not meet a strict Daubert test, but is
nonetheless central to the identification paradigm." The law needs to
think more deeply about the kinds of knowing on which its claims of
proof repose. And part of that thinking should concern the narrative
construction of evidence.
69. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (2002). Pollak cites the extension
of Daubert to include non-scientific expert testimony in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137 (1999). But it is not clear that Kumho Tire should be read as a relaxation of Daubert
so much as an attempt to extend the Daubert "gate-keeping" function of judges to other kinds
of evidence.
70. Mnookin asks: "How, then, do we evaluate other forms of knowledge, tacit knowledge,
craft knowledge, knowledge based on experience, or hybrid knowledge, part science, part craft,
like fingerprinting?" Mnookin, supra note 64, at 68. See further her remark, in an Internet
exchange:
That fingerprint examiners have been permitted (since 1911!) to testify in a language of
certainty (routinely giving their opinion that they are 'positive' that the prints came from
the same person), without any rigorous statistical basis for this claim, is something of a
scandal. At the same time, fingerprinting is nonetheless probably a whole lot more
reliable than a great deal of nonexpert evidence that we routinely permit (take, for
example, eyewitness testimony), so it seems somewhat perverse to exclude it.
Richard Friedman, D.H. Kaye, Jennifer Mnookin, Dale Nance, & Michael Saks, Expert
Testimony on Fingerprints.- An Internet Exchange, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 91, 96 (2002).
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All the practices of identification by way of signs interpreted as
clues in the narrative of what happened, who passed by, involve a
"retrospective prophecy," a construction of the story of the past by
way of its outcome, what it was leading to. It is in the peculiar nature
of narrative as a sense-making system that clues are revealing, that
prior events are prior, and causes are causal only retrospectively. As
Genette argued, narrative offers "the determination of means by
ends... of causes by effects." If the narrative went nowhere-never
became a complete story-there would be no decisive enchainment
of its incidents, no sense of inevitable discovery; the units of the
narrative would cease to be functional. Such, Jean-Paul Sartre
argued, is the difference between living and telling. To tell is to
conceive life as adventure, in the etymological sense of the ad-venire,
that which is to come, and by its coming to structure what leads up to
it. It is worth quoting at some length the reflections of Sartre's
fictional spokesman, Antoine Roquentin, on the problem. When you
begin to tell a story, you appear to start at the beginning. But, says
Roquentin:
In reality you have started at the end. It is there, invisible and
present, it is what gives these few words the pomp and value of a
beginning: "I was out walking, I had left the town without
realizing, I was thinking about my money troubles." This
sentence, taken simply for what it is, means that the guy was
absorbed, morose, a hundred miles from an adventure, exactly
in a mood to let things happen without noticing them. But the
end is there, transforming everything. For us, the guy is already
the hero of the story. His moroseness, his money troubles are
much more precious than ours, they are all gilded by the light of
future passions. And the story goes on in the reverse: instants
have stopped piling themselves up in a haphazard way one on
another, they are caught up by the end of the story which draws
them and each one in its turn draws the instant preceding it: "It
was night, the street was deserted." The sentence is thrown out
negligently, it seems superfluous; but we don't let ourselves be
duped, we put it aside: this is a piece of information whose value
we will understand later on. And we feel that the hero has lived
all the details of this night as annunciations, as promises, or even
that he lived only those that were promises, blind and deaf to all
that did not herald adventure. We forget that the future wasn't
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which offered him in disorderly fashion its monotonous riches,
and he did not choose.
On this statement, any narrative telling presupposes an end that
will transform its apparently random details "as annunciations, as
promises" of what is to come, and that what-is-to-come transforms
because it gives meaning to, makes significant the details as leading
to the end. Carlos Fuentes has provided an appropriate commentary
and confirmation in a short story called Aura, where the plot works
precisely backwards, from death to birth.72
Roland Barthes once suggested that narrative may be built on a
generalization of the philosophical error of "post hoc, ergo propter
hoc': narrative plotting makes it seem that if B follows A it is
because B is somehow logically entailed by A.73 And certainly it is
part of the "logic" of narrative to make it appear that temporal
connection is also causal connection. This indeed may be one of the
uses of narrative: we need to be able to discover connections in life,
to have it make sense, to rescue passing time from meaningless
successivity. One of the projects of complex narratives-such as
novels--has often been to question such connections, to ask about
the possible randomness of existence. If we associate the random and
arbitrary with modernist questionings of traditional plotting---see,
for instance, the inconclusive wanderings of such a film as
Michelangelo Antonioni's L'A vventura,74 or the last line of Camus's
The Stranger, where Meursault gives himself up to the "tender
indifference" of the universe 75-- the nineteenth-century novel often
suggests through its multiple plots the contingencies that attend
upon the ways things turn out. Novels often appear to stage a
struggle between chaos and meaning. But their very existence as
novels, as writing about life rather than life itself, must generally
assure that they conclude, however tenuously, in favor of meaning.
In the inevitable discovery doctrine, the law comes down firmly on
the side of meaning, conjuring away the specter of meaninglessness,
a chaotic universe in which searches would not necessarily lead to
anything. It is in this context that the footnote of Feldhacker appears
so portentous: it images law's belief that an infinitely long and
infinitely thorough search would inevitably lead to "any and all
71. SARTRE, supra note 17, at 59-60 (my translation).
72. CARLOS FUENTES, AURA (1962). For an English translation, see AURA (Lysander
Kemp trans., 1965).
73. ROLAND BARTHES, Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative, in THE
BARTHES READER 266 (Susan Sontag ed. & Richard Howard trans., 1982).
74. L'AVVENTURA (Cino Del Duco 1960).
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pieces of evidence in the world." This remarkable comment
presupposes an infinitely knowable world, one laid out in tracks and
traces-recall the gridlines marked off by Agent Ruxlow in
Nix-waiting to be deciphered. If this may be a contestable picture
of the world, it is an accurate picture of the law, which assumes that
its quarry exists, and that its discovery procedures, if patient and
thorough enough, will find it. In the doctrine of inevitable discovery,
then, the law is merely affirming-in fairly spectacular form-its own
nature. And inevitable discovery allows us to see that its nature is
that of the "retrospective prophecy," of the narrative put together
from tracks and traces into a coherent plot that gains meaning from
its end, from what it leads to. Inevitable discovery is in this sense
what the Russian Formalists might have called a "laying bare of the
device": one of those moments that images the procedures and the
very nature of the text in question.
When we speak of "the narrative construction of reality"-in
Jerome Bruner's terms, how narrative "operates as an instrument of
mind in the construction of reality"7--we must mean, among other
things, the ways in which narrative sequence, plot, and intelligibility
are used by humans to make sense of their lives and their world. It
was precisely his reflection on the workings of narrative structure in
the creation of intelligibility and meaning in human action-a
reflection continued in his autobiography, The Words--that led
Sartre eventually to renounce the novel as genre, since it came to
appear to him a violation of existential freedom, a misrepresentation
of the open-endedness of becoming. Yet one might respond that the
renunciation of narrative is not an option, since narrative
construction of reality is a basic human operation, learned in infancy,
and culturally omnipresent. For better or worse, we are stuck with
narrative and its ways of making sense. The conclusion would then
seem to be that we should become better narratologists-better
analysts of the stories we tell, the ways they work, the effects they
have.
Bruner notes that the way the human mind processes knowledge
as story "has been grossly neglected by students of mind raised
either in the rationalist or in the empiricist traditions."" One can add
that it has been neglected as well by students of the law. While "legal
storytelling" has attracted increasing scholarly interest, the main
focus, as mentioned earlier, has been on "storytelling for
oppositionists"-essentially the claim that narrative can contest and
76. Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 6
(1991).
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destabilize the dominant forms of legal reasoning, which tend to
exclude story as not sufficiently disciplined by law talk. And, as I
suggested earlier, one scans legal opinions in vain for any mention of
narrative as a category that needs thinking about--Souter's opinion
in Old Chief remains exceptional. Yet, certainly where Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is concerned-when we are talking about
searches and seizures and how we understand their workings in
relation to constitutional "rules"--the narrative construction of the
reality is the reality, and how it is constructed makes all the
difference in the defendant's story.
The Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence itself offers a
form of reading back from the end. Constitutional
narratives-narratives in which the Court traces the history of an
idea, a doctrine, and its interpretations over the course of time-very
often claim a return to the beginning, to the text and context of the
Constitution itself, in order to track forward the development of text
and idea. This may be especially true when the Court is aware it is
propounding a new interpretation, one that will not be accepted
without resistance."8 Thus, for instance, Chief Justice Earl Warren in
Miranda v. Arizona, claims: "The cases before us raise questions
which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal
jurisprudence.. . ."" He also says:
We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our
holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an
application of principles long recognized .... That case was but
an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our
Constitution.... These precious rights were fixed in our
Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle."
The ruling in Miranda, Warren claims, is simply the emergence into
the light of day of what was all along entailed by the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda makes
good on a long history, it realizes that narrative's latent meaning.
Inevitably, the dissenters in Miranda claim that Warren has the
story wrong. To Warren's assertion that the majority's ruling is "not
an innovation," Justice Byron White ripostes that "the Court has not
discovered or found the law.., what it has done is to make new law
and new public policy ... .,, Another dissent by Justice John
78. Innovation in the law may require a particularly confident rhetoric of non-innovation.
See the comment on Miranda by Joseph Halpern: "In contrast to the dissents, the majority
opinion employs a comfortable rhetoric that denies and masks change." Joseph Halpern,
Judicious Discretion: Miranda and Legal Change, 2 YALE J. CRITICISM 53 (1987).
79. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,439 (1966).
80. 1d. at 442.
81. Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
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Marshall Harlan refers to "the Court's new constitutional code of
rules for confessions. ' Harlan sets out to mark the point at which
the Court "jumped the rails" 3 -the point at which it deviated, with
dire results, from the correct narrative line. He, too, reaches back to
origins, to claim that the majority's reliance on the Fifth Amendment
is "a trompe l'oeil," a deceptive reality effect which it has taken for
reality itself. After rehearsing what he sees as the correct
constitutional narrative, Harlan brands the majority's ruling as a
wholly implausible narrative: "One is entitled to feel astonished that
the Constitution can be read to produce this result."' And in his
peroration, Harlan declares, citing the words of a famous bygone
Justice, Robert Jackson: "This Court is forever adding new stories to
the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of
collapsing when one story too many is added." 5 There seems to be
an interesting, if unintended, pun here, on storeys as features of
houses and stories as narrative. In both senses of the word "story"
Harlan implies that the new narrative episode written in Miranda
brings the collapse of the whole narrative. It makes it the wrong
story.
For all their discourse of origins, then, both majority and dissent in
Miranda implicitly rely on the notion that the outcome of the story,
the ending written (however provisionally) by the current ruling,
determines the meaning of the story's earlier episodes: the present
rewrites the past.86 While the argument from origins is undoubtedly
sincere and necessary, in its desire to make origins entail a certain
outcome it, too, shares the logic of "inevitable discovery." It has the
"double logic" of the "retrospective prophecy," arguing that the
stipulated outcome is the only way to realize the history of
constitutional interpretation.
The authors of the "joint opinion" in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey," Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, touched on an
element of this double logic in their eloquent defense of stare decisis.
The very concept of the rule of law, they write, requires continuity
over time, so that citizens may rely upon the law. Thus, though one
might rule differently were the issue at hand coming to adjudication
for the first time, the fact it was once ruled upon in a certain way,
82. Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 508 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 518 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. Stanley Fish makes a similar point in his critique of Ronald Dworkin. See Stanley Fish,
Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, in DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY 87,94 (1989).
87. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Caseyreaffirmed (with some modifications) the right to abortion
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and that people have come to rely on that ruling, alters the second
adjudication, giving a heavy burden of proof to those who would
reverse course. As the joint opinion puts it, to both those who
approve and those who disapprove a Constitutional ruling but
struggle to respect it, "the Court implicitly undertakes to remain
steadfast."' "Steadfastness" is indeed not only pragmatic-assuring
a uniform law that can be relied upon--but also moral: "Like the
character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be
earned over time."'89 Note that "over time": earned legitimacy
depends on a history, a narrative of consistency. The moral Court,
like the moral individual, must be true to itself.'
Raising the moral stakes, the joint opinion writes further: "Our
Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of
Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent
succession."9 To claim that the Constitution is a "covenant" that
runs throughout American history is to foreground the history of
constitutional interpretation as a master narrative, into which each
new episode-each new Court ruling--must be seamlessly fitted.
The narrative must, like a genealogy, be "coherent." How may this
be achieved? Essentially, says the joint opinion, through maintaining
the perception of legitimacy through principled rulings:
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow
people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for
them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with
social and political pressures .... Thus, the Court's legitimacy
depends on making legally principled decisions under
circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently
plausible to be accepted by the Nation.'
The narrative of the covenant relies on precedent and stare decisis in
order that change appear to be incremental and principled, so that
sequence appear not random but an instance of consecution. The
most apt words in the joint opinion's sentence may be "sufficiently
plausible." It points us to the rhetoric of the Court: what is
"sufficiently plausible" is that which persuades its readership, its
audiences, which assures narrative conviction in its narratees.
88. Casey, 505 U.S. at 868 (1992).
89. Id
90. See Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent in Bush v. Gore, a ruling which he sees as
undermining confidence in the Court: "That confidence is a public treasure. It has been built
slowly over many years, some of which were marked by a Civil War and the tragedy of
segregation. It is a vitally necessary ingredient of any successful effort to protect basic liberty
and, indeed, the rule of law itself." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157-58 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
91. Casey, 505 U.S. at 901.
92. Id. at 865-66.
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The logic of the joint opinion is necessarily circular: it claims that
rulings by the Court will be accepted if and when they appear to fit
seamlessly within the master narrative, which in turn means that
their acceptance creates the seamless narrative, the perception that
the law is "steadfast," built on precedent and stare decisis. What
"suffices" for the "sufficiently plausible" is ... what suffices. I don't
think there is anything wrong with this logic. But I want to note that
it is to a large degree the logic of narrative. It is again Genette's "the
determination of means by ends.., of causes by effects." The
doctrine of stare decisis may itself be something of a trompe loeil, or
a cover-up, offering an illusion of entailment of a certain conclusion
from precedent, whereas the cognitive process really has begun with
the conclusion and then postulated the precedential history. Judicial
opinions are full of a rhetoric of constraint: the judge cannot rule
otherwise than he is doing because he is constrained by precedent.
Whatever his personal preferences in the case, the outcome is
imposed upon him by the history leading up to it.
I think the notion of "retrospective prophecy" perfectly
characterizes the constitutional narratives written by the Supreme
Court, and perhaps indeed most legal narrative in general. It is a
prophetic narrative cast in the backward mode, implicitly arguing
that the ruling in the case at hand is the fulfillment of what was
called for at the beginning--somewhat in the manner that medieval
Christian theologians argued that the Gospels offered a fulfillment of
the prophetic narratives of the Hebrew Bible, as figure and
fulfillment. For Augustine, for instance, Moses is a figura Christi,
Noah's Ark a praefiguratio ecclesiae3 Past history is seen as
realized, as fulfilled, in the present. It is as if the past were pregnant
with the present, waiting to be delivered of the wisdom which the
Court majestically presents in its ruling. Recall the joint opinion's
word "covenant" to describe the Constitution, precisely in its
historical relation to the citizenry. Each new ruling by the Supreme
Court is an episode in the unfolding narrative of that covenant.
The joint opinion's use of the word "covenant" makes that
narrative one in which the meaning of the story is progressively
unfolded, as realization of what was there from the start in potentia,
where the potential there from the start is only known in and by its
realization. On this paradigm, constitutional interpretation rightly
understood does not make new law, it understands that the
apparently new law it is making was there from the start, and that its
promulgation--in the Court's present ruling--gives a new
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understanding of the history leading up to it. The discourse of origins
and constraints offered by the Court tells us that it is writing its past
history of interpretation in terms of the ending now proposed.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's unspoken reliance upon narrative in its
constitutional jurisprudence thus offers something of an arche-
teleological discourse, one that constantly stresses origins in order to
achieve ends. I suggested that there is a measure of cover-up in such
a discourse, that it represses its determination by ends to stress its
entailment by origins. But such a narrative of the covenant is no
doubt merely necessary--covenantal discourse, one might say, is like
that. The structure of prophecy and fulfillment is probably requisite
in any claim to a master narrative that governs societies. If the
discourse of American constitutional interpretation turns out to be
remarkably biblical, that should not come as a surprise, since it is
difficult to imagine a society without a providential discourse
underlying it. If the Constitution is the American myth of origins, we
must expect it to be treated like other forms of mythic thinking. All
one might ask for is a greater degree of awareness of its own
narrative logic. And this awareness is what the encounter of law with
literature--more properly, with literary reading, in an attention to
narrative design and intention-might, in some yet unrealized future
dialogue, bring to light.
My argument has come down to this: when we start probing the
interesting piece of Fourth Amendment doctrine known as
"inevitable discovery," we find implicated within it a larger problem
of legal narrative, which is in turn a problem of narrative as a human
function and cognitive instrument. Stories are not events in the
world, but rather a way in which we speak the world, and in so doing
give it shape and meaning. Stories tend to strive toward discovery,
toward what Aristotle called recognition (anagnorisis), and strive to
make this discovery or recognition inevitable. That is what the
rhetoric of narrative is all about. And it is important that legal
decisionmakers understand that how one tells shapes and confers
intention on what one tells: that there are no facts of a search
independent of the narrative form given to them. It is thus not
bumptious to propose-from the point of view of a student of
narrative-that the legal analytical toolkit could do well to include
some "narratology." That is, if the law makes large use of narrative,
its logics and rhetorics-most often without overt recognition that it
is doing so-it might sharpen its discussion of certain issues where
narrativity is very much at issue-as it always seems to be when
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search and seizure are involved-by some attention to what
narrative is and how it functions.
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